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Background: Increasingly, health policy-makers and managers all over the world look for alternative forms of
organisation and governance in order to add more value and quality to their health systems. In recent years, the
central government in England mandated several cross-sector health initiatives based on collaborative governance
arrangements. However, there is little empirical evidence that examines local implementation responses to such
centrally-mandated collaborations.
Methods: Data from the national study of Health Innovation and Education Clusters (HIECs) are used to provide
comprehensive empirical evidence about the implementation of collaborative governance arrangements in cross-sector
health networks in England. The study employed a mixed-methods approach, integrating both quantitative and
qualitative data from a national survey of the entire population of HIEC directors (N = 17; response rate = 100%), a group
discussion with 7 HIEC directors, and 15 in-depth interviews with HIEC directors and chairs.
Results: The study provides a description and analysis of local implementation responses to the central government
mandate to establish HIECs. The latter represent cross-sector health networks characterised by a vague mandate with
the provision of a small amount of new resources. Our findings indicate that in the case of HIECs such a mandate
resulted in the creation of rather fluid and informal partnerships, which over the period of three years made partial-to-full
progress on governance activities and, in most cases, did not become self-sustaining without government funding.
Conclusion: This study has produced valuable insights into the implementation responses in HIECs and possibly other
cross-sector collaborations characterised by a vague mandate with the provision of a small amount of new resources.
There is little evidence that local dominant coalitions appropriated the central HIEC mandate to their own ends. On the
other hand, there is evidence of interpretation and implementation of the central mandate by HIEC leaders to serve their
local needs. These findings augur well for Academic Health Science Networks, which pick up the mantle of large-scale,
cross-sector collaborations for health and innovation. This study also highlights that a supportive policy environment and
sufficient time would be crucial to the successful implementation of new cross-sector health collaborations.
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Increasingly, health policy-makers and managers all over
the world look for alternative forms of organisation and
governance in order to add more value and quality to
their health systems. Network forms of organisation and
governance represent an alternative to traditional hier-
archies or markets. Their spread can be empirically ob-
served both in the public and private sector in different
countries [1]. In the British public sector, they have been
invoked as a means of addressing the many social issues
that cut across organisation and sector boundaries [2].
In the National Health Service (NHS), “managed clinical
networks” were established in the 1990’s, and other
forms of network followed [3]. More recently, attention
has turned to the anticipated benefits of collaboration
with the higher education sector, local authorities, indus-
try, and the third sector. In addition to improvements to
the local health systems, policy-makers anticipate that
cross-sector collaboration will drive innovation and eco-
nomic gain. They believe that cross-sector collaborations
enable participant organisations to manage large-scale
change, to exchange information, leverage each other’s
resources, and co-ordinate activities. Yet, evidence from
the United States suggests that cross-sector health part-
nerships may be difficult to implement and govern for
the following reasons [4,5]:
 they are based on voluntary collaboration rather
than hierarchical control;
 participant organisations have different time
horizons, risk orientations, and decision-making
styles;
 accountability can be difficult to define and enforce;
and
 the levels of commitment and resource participation
differ between organisations.
In recent years, the central government in England
mandated several cross-sector initiatives aimed at im-
proving the quality of care in the NHS and developing
the landscape for innovation [6]. While scholars and
practitioners have begun to examine these initiatives
[7-27], there is a paucity of evidence about the imple-
mentation of collaborative governance arrangements.
This article contributes to the literature on collaborative
governance in cross-sector health networks by providing
comprehensive empirical evidence about collaborative
governance arrangements and practices in one such net-
work in England – the Health Innovation and Education
Clusters (HIECs). In doing so, the article increases the
understanding of collaborative governance in cross-
sector networks in England’s publicly funded and run
NHS, with the potential for the findings discussed here to
be considered within other health systems internationally.Cross-sector collaborative governance in the NHS
HIECs were one of several types of formal cross-sector
health initiatives based on collaborative governance that
were mandated by the Department of Health, England in
recent years as part of the NHS innovation landscape
(Table 1).
In 2007, the National Institute for Health Research
(NIHR) mandated and funded new initiatives promoting
partnerships for translational research. NIHR funding
schemes for Biomedical Research Centres and Units (BRCs
and BRUs) invited NHS teaching hospitals and universities
to establish formal partnerships for translational research.
The NIHR selected the best partnerships through an open
competition and provided them with a large amount of
funding to conduct translational research [28-31]. An
emerging empirical literature has demonstrated a positive
impact of NIHR BRCs and NIHR BRUs both on the trans-
lational research infrastructure and on the institutional re-
lationships between the NHS, academia, and industry [8,9].
In 2008, a similar NIHR funding scheme for Collabo-
rations for Leadership in Applied Health Research and
Care (CLAHRCs) invited NHS teaching hospitals and
commissioners, universities, and other relevant local or-
ganisations to establish formal partnerships for applied
health research. The NIHR selected the best partner-
ships through an open competition and provided them
with a substantial amount of funding to conduct applied
health research and translate research findings into prac-
tice [28,32]. An emerging empirical literature on NIHR
CLAHRCs has successfully applied the community of
practice theory to the design and evaluation of theory-
informed applied health research, illuminated the
boundaries that exist between various professional and
organisational groups, and explored ways to mobilise
knowledge across such boundaries [13,14,22,27]. An-
other important strand of the literature on NIHR
CLAHRCs has proposed theory-informed realist evalu-
ations to determine “what works, for whom, how, and
in what circumstances” [11,19].
In 2009, the Department of Health, England mandated
a new kind of partnerships between NHS teaching
hospitals and universities – Academic Health Science
Centres (AHSCs) [26]. The Department of Health, England
selected the best partnerships through an open competi-
tion, and provided them with a broad mandate to
increase strategic alignment of NHS providers and uni-
versities across research, education, and patient care, but
without any new resources [33]. Instead, they benefited
from the prestige of being recognised by an international
panel of experts as the leading partnerships of this kind
in England [10]. An emerging empirical literature on
AHSCs has analysed the establishment of AHSCs in
England within the context of international policy trans-
fer [24], their organisational models [10], organisational
Table 1 Cross-sector collaborations designated by the Department of Health in England, 2008-2014





NHS provider trusts and higher
education institutions
“to conduct translational research to transform scientific
breakthroughs into life-saving treatments for patients” [29]
5 designated NIHR Comprehensive BRCs and 7 designated
NIHR Specialist BRCs received £450 m of government
funding for 2007–2012 [28];
2012 for five
years
11 designated NIHR BRCs received £677 m of government
funding for 2012–2017, ranging between £2 m and £23 m





NHS provider trusts and higher
education institutions
“to undertake translational research in priority areas of high
disease burden and clinical need” [30]
15 designated NIHR BRUs received £55 m of government




20 designated NIHR BRUs received £126 m of government
funding for 2012–2017, ranging between £1 m and £2 m












“to conduct applied health research across the NHS, and
translate research findings into improved outcomes for
patients” [32]
9 designated NIHR CLAHRCs received £50 m of
government funding for 2008–2013, ranging between £1
m and £2 m per NIHR CLAHRC per year [28];
2014 for five
years
13 designated NIHR CLAHRCs received £124 m of
government funding for 2014–2018, approximately £2 m





NHS providers and higher
education institutions
“to increase strategic alignment of NHS providers and their
university partner, specifically in world-class research, health
education and patient care, in order to improve health and
healthcare delivery, including through increased translation
of discoveries from basic science into benefits for patients”
[33]
5 designated AHSCs in 2009 and 6 designated AHSCs in
2014 benefited from the prestige of being designated by
an international panel of experts, but were not meant to









“to enable high quality patient care and services by quickly
bringing the benefits of research and innovation directly to
patients, and by strengthening the co-ordination of educa-
tion and training so that it has the breadth and depth to
support excellence” [34]
17 designated HIECs received £11 m of government
funding in 2010 and £10 million in 2011, but were meant









“to align education, clinical research, informatics, innovation,
training and education and healthcare delivery… to
improve patient and population health outcomes by
translating research into practice, and developing and
implementing integrated health care services” [36]
15 designated AHSNs received £70 m of government
funding in 2013, ranging between £2 m and £7 m per
AHSN per year, and expected to receive further funding for
up to five years, but were meant to become self-sustaining
in the longer-term [37]
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Figure 1 Cross-sector collaborations designated by the
Department of Health in England, 2008–2014: characteristics of
mandates according to Montjoy RS and O’Toole LJ[38].
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[26], inter-professional dynamics [23], and showed that
alignment in AHSCs is hard to achieve because of the bi-
furcating accountabilities of academic and clinical partners
to various government and public agencies [26].
In 2009, the Department of Health, England also man-
dated wider cross-sector partnerships – Health Innovation
and Education Clusters (HIECs). Unlike NIHR BRCs, NIHR
BRUs, NIHR CLAHRCs, and AHSCs, which were exclusive
partnerships between a single university and its principal
NHS affiliates designed to further strengthen centres of ex-
cellence in research, HIECs were inclusive partnerships be-
tween NHS providers and commissioners, higher education
institutions, local government, charities, and industry. The
Department of Health, England selected the best partner-
ships through an open competition, and provided them
with a broad mandate to enable high quality patient care by
speeding up the adoption and spread of innovation. Seven-
teen HIECs received a small amount of central government
pump-priming funding in the first two years of their exist-
ence with the expectation of attracting local match funding
and become self-sustaining in the longer run [34,35].
The launch of HIECs coincided with the change of
government, and the incoming government proposed a
wide-ranging set of reforms, which in the following two
years resulted in the dissolution of NHS strategic health
authorities, the cessation of funding for the HIECs,
and the creation in 2013 of new cross-sector health col-
laborations, i.e. Academic Health Science Networks
(AHSNs). AHSNs included a large number of NHS pro-
viders and commissioners, higher education institutions,
local authorities, charities, and industry. They received a
broad mandate to align education, clinical research, in-
formatics, innovation, training and education, and health-
care delivery in large geographies in order to improve
patient and population health outcomes [36,37]. AHSNs
received funding towards set-up costs in the first year and
expected to receive further funding for up to five years,
but were meant to become self-sustaining in the longer-
term. Also in 2013, the Department of Health, England
decided not to extend the funding for HIECs and the ma-
jority ceased to exist in their original form.
The HIEC mandate
In order to consider what is distinctive, as well as what
is common, about the implementation of collaborative
governance in HIECs, it is useful to classify all of the
cross-sector health partnerships mentioned above in the
same way. For this purpose, we can use a theory-based
framework originally proposed by Montjoy and O’Toole
for their analysis of problems in intra-organisational im-
plementation [38], which also continue to apply in the
context of inter-organisational implementation and are
multiplied by the number of participating organisations[39]. The framework distinguishes between two major
characteristics of external mandates: (1) whether they
are vague or specific, and (2) whether they provide new
resources or not (Figure 1) [38]. There are both practical
and theoretical advantages of using this framework. For
implementation practitioners, it offers a set of assump-
tions and propositions that highlight potential imp-
lementation problems. For implementation scholars, it
provides variables that can be used in future research for
the development of a more contextualised “programme
theory” [19]. For public administration scholars, it provides
an opportunity to use our empirical evidence from health-
care to test theory generated through the application of
this framework in other domains of public administration.
The framework distinguishes between two major charac-
teristics of external mandates: (1) whether they are vague
or specific, and (2) whether they provide new resources or
not (Figure 1) [38]. The HIEC mandate is of Type A, i.e.
vague with new resources. Such mandates offer the highest
degree of discretion to local leaders to interpret and imple-
ment the central mandate according to their goals and
world-views, using the resources provided. However, such
mandates can also result in two potential implementation
problems [38]:
 appropriation of the mandate to their own ends by a
local dominant coalition (i.e. those who normally get
their own way in the direction of activities), and
 inaction due to unwillingness or inability of the local
dominant coalition to impose a single interpretation
on the mandate.
According to the Department of Health, England,
HIECs were intended to be “partnerships between NHS
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higher education sector (universities and colleges), indus-
try (healthcare and non-healthcare industries) and other
public and private sector organisations” [34]. The pur-
pose of HIECs was defined as “to enable high quality pa-
tient care and services by quickly bringing the benefits of
research and innovation directly to patients, and by
strengthening the co-ordination of education and training
so that it has the breadth and depth to support excel-
lence” [34]. In implementing their mandate, HIECs were




 deliver measurable impact in innovation,
 focus on quality,
 support the commissioner/provider split,
 strengthen accountability.
Governance was central to the implementation of the
HIEC mandate because it provided a mechanism for
achieving and maintaining a desired boundary-spanning
partnership composition, managing competing interests
or confusion over the purpose, and providing account-
ability to the various stakeholders. In a similar way to
other cross-sector collaborations (Table 1), the Depart-
ment of Health, England followed a permissive approach
to HIECs’ governance. As a prerequisite for designation,
HIECs had to develop robust and effective governance
arrangements. In doing so, they were expected to explore
various legal forms and determine which governance ar-
rangements best fitted their local needs [34]. Thus, by
studying collaborative governance arrangements and prac-
tices in HIECs, we can draw lessons for policy-makers
who may be considering choices between more or less
prescription of forms of governance and specificity of
mandate. Moreover, empirical data from HIECs can be
used in conjunction with empirical data from other cross-
sector collaborations to generalise about cross-sector col-
laborative governance.
Methods
This study received approval from the University of
Oxford’s Medical Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics
Committee (MSD-IDREC-C1-2012-160). It employed a
mixed-methods approach, integrating both quantitative
and qualitative data from a national survey, a group dis-
cussion, and in-depth interviews. Firstly, we conducted
an online survey into Self-Assessment of Governance
Arrangements (SAGA) among directors of all 17 HIECs
in order to gather both objective data and directors’ per-
ceptions of HIECs’ governance arrangements and prac-
tices. The survey achieved a 100% response rate, andthus provided comprehensive information about the en-
tire population of HIECs. Secondly, we held a group dis-
cussion with 7 HIEC directors and senior managers to
check the validity of survey findings and to identify import-
ant collaborative governance issues not covered in the sur-
vey. Finally, we conducted in-depth interviews among 10
directors and 5 chairs to triangulate data from the survey
and group discussion and to gain broader qualitative
insights.
We developed the SAGA survey from a review of the
literature on collaborative governance and input from
practitioners. The review mainly included US studies, es-
pecially a very rich vein of research on collaborative gov-
ernance in Community Care NetworksSM [4,5,40-46]. To
formulate an initial pool of questions, we used insights
from the relevant literature, and adapted elements from
previous studies. These included several concepts and
items related to the partnership composition, legal form,
decision-making authority, and progress on governance
activities [4], decision-making dynamics [45], manage-
ment [44], accountability [47], and partnership termin-
ation and succession [48].
Following feedback from practitioners, we reworked
the questions and collated them into an online SAGA
survey using SurveyMonkey®. To test its content, read-
ability, and time-to-completion, we piloted the survey
with three HIEC directors in December 2012. Following
feedback from the pilot, further changes were made to
the survey prior to its administration. The final version
of the SAGA survey included 83 questions covering 10
substantive categories as well as informed consent, per-
sonal details, confidentiality, and willingness to partici-
pate in further study (Additional file 1). We fielded the
final version of the SAGA survey in January-February
2013, and then analysed its results (Additional file 2).
Two co-authors (CO and PVO) administered the
group discussion during a National HIEC Directors’ Net-
work meeting in March 2013. Seven participants were
informed of the initial findings of the survey, were asked
for their views on the validity and interpretation of the
findings, and were guided into a discussion on the im-
portant collaborative governance issues not covered in the
survey. The group discussion informed both the interpret-
ation of the survey responses and the development of the
interview protocol. Two co-authors (PVO and CO) con-
ducted interviews either via telephone or face-to-face.
Interview protocols were guided by the survey responses,
themes emerging from the group discussion, and by the-
oretical insights from the relevant literature [38,48-52].
Each interview lasted approximately 30–45 minutes, was
digitally recorded and fully transcribed.
Printed interview transcripts (75 pages/36,959 words)
and open-ended answers from the survey (7 pages/2,733
words) were coded manually and synthesised around the
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Quotations were used to support and illustrate the quan-
titative findings and new emerging themes from the sur-
vey. Two co-authors (PVO and CO) met regularly to
discuss and agree the interpretation and synthesis of the
data. To ensure internal consistency, one co-author (SCP)
cross-checked the accuracy of the quantitative results of
the survey, the interpretation of the qualitative data, and


























Figure 2 Cross-sector participation in HIEC activities.Resultsa
Partnership composition
HIECs were fluid and inclusive networks, with varying
degrees of participation of partners from different sec-
tors. Although the term “cluster” implied the close geo-
graphical proximity of cluster members, HIECs included
partners from large geographical areas. Seventeen HIECs
covered 9 of 10 NHS areas in England, and often repli-
cated the boundaries of NHS strategic health authorities,
which supported the development and implementation
of HIECs. Therefore, HIECs are better understood as geo-
graphically dispersed networks, rather than geographically
concentrated clusters.
Approximately half of HIECs (53%) had a fixed number
of partners, which varied greatly, from 5 to 60, averaging
24 partners. Those HIECs that did not have a fixed num-
ber of partners explained this by the fact that HIECs were
project-driven networks, and thus different partners par-
ticipated in different projects. As one respondent put it:
“We aimed to find the right mix of organisations to further
our objectives for each project we started”.
The majority of partners in HIECs were either self-
selected foundational members (47%), who all came to-
gether to form HIECs, or those invited to join in by the
foundational members (47%). In just one HIEC (6%), the
majority of the partners were required to apply formally
for membership; and none of the HIECs granted mem-
bership on a basis of paying a membership fee. Approxi-
mately one third of HIECs (29%) had different classes of
partners, such as full/core members and affiliates. In the
majority of cases, affiliates were those members who
elected not to pay a membership fee in HIECs where
such a fee existed, but still wanted to participate in
HIEC activities. Therefore, having different classes of
partners was a strategy aimed at including more partners
in HIEC activities.
Participation in collaborative projects across the life-
time of the HIEC varied between different sectors. Ac-
cording to responses from 15 HIECs, all of them had
NHS provider trusts, NHS commissioners, and higher
education institutions (HEIs) involved in their collabora-
tive projects, on average 10 NHS provider trusts, 4 NHS
commissioners, and 5 HEIs. Participation from othersectors varied. When asked to indicate whether par-
ticipation from different sectors has been sufficient
for HIECs to accomplish their objectives, participation
from local government, GP practices, and industry was
deemed to be too little (Figure 2). One respondent com-
mented: “Given the scale of some of these sectors, we
have done no more than scratch the surface.”
Legal form
None of the HIECs were constituted as incorporated
bodies and none were registered as a charity. The per-
ception of the limited lifespan and uncertain funding of
HIECs due to political instability was cited by the re-
spondents as the main reason for not seeking incorpor-
ation or registration. One respondent remarked: “It felt
like the environment was sufficiently unstable, that we
should use our funding and position to start work, and
form a bridge to whatever would happen next”. Other
major reasons included the complexity and cost of creat-
ing a corporate legal entity for such a diverse number of
partners from different sectors, and a lack of perceived
benefits. Likewise, only 41% of HIECs have a signed mem-
bership agreement, or a memorandum of understanding.
Although HIECs did not have their own legal person-
ality, they were hosted by legal entities, mostly by HEIs
and NHS provider trusts, or as in one case a corporate
legal entity created by a HEI and NHS provider trusts,
i.e. an Academic Health Science Centre. Importantly,
many respondents felt that not having to deal with in-
corporation or registration as a charity speeded up the
implementation of HIECs. The initial governance ar-
rangements of HIECs had to be sufficiently robust to
satisfy the host organisation, but we did not find any evi-
dence to suggest that they assimilated governance prac-
tices from their host organisation. Whereas the perceived
benefits of being hosted by a HEI included flexibility,
entrepreneurship, and stability, the perceived benefits of
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with NHS partners, ownership within the NHS, and allow-
ing staff to retain NHS pension rights. All HIECs valued
operational independence from their host organisation,
and there were no significant differences identified in the
nature of the hosting arrangements by virtue of HIECs be-
ing hosted in different sectors.
Despite the fact that none of the HIECs had a legal
personality of their own, in the majority of cases, they
nevertheless aimed to emulate the governance processes
of formal public sector organisations and were able to
persuade a number of senior leaders from the local health
system to participate in governance activity throughout
the life of the HIEC. One respondent noted: “We do not
actually exist as a legal entity, so we really took the view
right from the beginning that it was therefore important to
have proper governance and to be seen to be governed
properly because that was the only thing we had…it was
the only thing to show that we actually existed.”
Governing body
HIECs had relatively informal governance arrangements
determined by the local circumstances. Most commonly,
the governing body of HIECs was called “a board”, “a
partnership board”, or “a steering group”, and met bi-
monthly or quarterly. It was usually inclusive and, while
having no legal constitution, most had a set of Terms of
Reference. The number of members on the board was
determined by the local circumstances and varied greatly
between 5 and 40, averaging 14 members. Only 24% of
HIECs made a distinction between non-executive and
executive members, and in 18% of HIECs that had mem-
bership fees, only paying members had voting rights. Al-
though participation in governance activities for non-voting
and non-fee paying members was limited, they still were
able to participate in HIEC projects.
There seemed to be no ideal number of board members
as only one HIEC that had 15 members on its board indi-
cated that it was too many because of difficulties in meet-
ing quorum requirements. Likewise, there was no ideal
breakdown of members by sector. NHS provider trusts,
higher education institutions, and NHS commissioners
were the most frequently represented sectors on the
board; industry, charities, local government, and GP prac-
tices were the least frequently represented. Additionally,
41% of HIECs have other bodies or individuals involved in
the governance process, e.g. a strategic health authority,
a stakeholder group, or a patient representative. Some
of the HIECs expressed regret in hindsight that their
boards had not been more inclusive: “Part of the vision
was to bring NHS and academic partners together…I
accept that the HIEC may also be involved in bringing
in industry and so forth, and frankly, I think, we failed
comprehensively in that regard.”All HIEC governing bodies had a chair, chosen either
as an independent person (53%), or a representative of
one of partners (47%). In the majority of HIECs, chairs
were nominated by key partners, or appointed by con-
sensus, or a vote among all partners. Only one HIEC chair
was appointed through an open competitive process. The
term of the chair ranged from 1 year to 4 years, or was
not specified due to the uncertain lifespan of HIECs. None
of the HIEC chairs worked a set number of hours per
week, and only 24% of them were paid.
All the interviewed respondents felt that the permis-
sive approach in the HIEC mandate to forming govern-
ance arrangements was helpful because it allowed HIECs
to develop governance arrangements that suited their
local circumstances best, often starting with local enthu-
siasts for the HIEC vision. Several respondents commen-
ted that the Department of Health should not have
prescribed a geographical footprint for HIECs because it
initially slowed down the formation of HIECs. Most
HIECs would probably agree with the chair who commen-
ted: “I personally was of the view that the HIEC should be
created as a local mechanism in line with local needs and
opportunities, and the only things that should be prescrip-
tive were to be sure that it does make a difference.”
Decision-making authority and dynamics
HIEC governing bodies exercised largely independent
decision-making authority within their mandate. All HIEC
governing bodies had authority to allocate resources and,
in the majority of cases, HIEC governing bodies had au-
thority to establish partnership initiatives, as well as to re-
port partnership performance. Yet, in 29% of HIECs, the
governing body itself did not have authority to navigate
the future through transition. Decision-making in HIECs
usually occurred in a non-confrontational, even passive,
atmosphere. Only 12% of HIECs felt that decision-making
occurred in a politically-charged atmosphere. Moreover,
59% of HIECs felt that they had never had disagreements
between or among governing body members. Most re-
spondents believed that this was because HIECs had rela-
tively small budgets.
We did not find evidence, in any of the localities, of a
dominant coalition of partners that appropriated the HIEC
mandate and resources to their own ends. In some cases,
the original group who developed the HIEC bid to the
Department of Health might have acted initially as though
they were dominant, but that changed once the HIEC
came into being. For example, one respondent commen-
ted: “we had three universities, who all contributed in the
pre-bid stage to identifying priorities…so the first thing we
had to do from the NHS perspective was to say ‘OK, well,
we’ll honour that, but we’ve also now got more than half the
cake, which now needs to be made available to other
[partners]’.”
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be attributable to the combination of two factors. On the
one hand, the HIEC mandate envisaged establishing inclu-
sive partnerships, which did not allow a small number of
partners to form strong dominant and exclusive coalitions.
On the other hand, the HIEC mandate came with a small
amount of new resources, which did not provide sufficient
incentive for strong coalitions to emerge.
Progress on governance activities
HIECs made partial-to-full progress on governance ac-
tivities (Figure 3). In 41% of HIECs, the governing body
owned a common vision and a common mission only to
a partial or variable extent. Most respondents believed
that a greater clarity of the HIEC mandate would have
helped avoid early-stage delays in implementation due to
a prolonged deliberation of the HIEC vision and mission.
One respondent recalled: “…every single member of the
HIEC Board had a completely different view of what the
HIEC was and what it wanted to achieve. Some of them
were quite benign and open, but others, their translation
of that was pretty much in terms of what they wanted to
get out of that. And it was not really that helpful in
terms of the Board coming together.” In contrast, another
respondent noted that, despite delays in implementation,
a prolonged deliberation of the HIEC mandate was help-
ful in the long run because it ensured a lot of buy-in
from partners.
In 59% of HIECs, the governing body had a clear view
of partner organisation roles only to a partial or variable
extent. This lack of full clarity on partner organisation
roles was attributed not only to the vague mandate, but
also to the intrinsically challenging nature of cross-sector
working. One respondent remarked: “Because our Board
is drawn from different sectors, they have some differences
in terms of how they conceptualise partnership working.”
In 53% of HIECs, the governing body did not fully direct
partnership organisations to fulfil their responsibilities.
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HIEC governing body owns clear 
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HIEC governing body directs 
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Figure 3 Progress on governance activities.on voluntary participation of partner organisations with a
varying degree of engagement and commitment.
Accountability was the most challenging area in govern-
ance activities. Only 35% of HIECs felt that their governing
body fully owned clear policies of accountability. Many re-
spondents believed that it was particularly challenging to
manage competing accountabilities of HIEC partners. One
respondent noted: “Our projects have many partners, who
may themselves have different accountabilities and even
different ideas about what accountability means.”
Management
HIECs had lean management teams. All HIECs had
some paid staff, on average 3.7 whole time equivalent
(wte), ranging from 0.2 wte to 9.9 wte. Most staff mem-
bers were either employed by the host organisation or
seconded from a partner organisation. The overall time
resource of HIEC staff was spent predominantly on op-
eration and project management, external relations and
communication, and strategic leadership (Figure 4).
All HIECs had a chief executive, who was usually called
“Director” and sometimes “Chief Executive”. In contrast
with HIEC chairs, 53% of HIEC chief executives were
appointed through an open competitive process. In many
HIECs, chief executives had more experience of governance
than chairs. One respondent recalled: “One of the things I
was specifically recruited for was experience of governance.
As Chief Executive, I have had considerable influence over
the way the Board has evolved and, especially, the way it is
drawn from a range of stakeholders.”
The majority of respondents acknowledged that the re-
lationships between the chief executive and the board
were different from those in traditional organisations.
Most commonly, the board and the chief executive col-
laborated in formulating the overall strategy and the board
supported the executive in the consequential development
of plans and projects to deliver the strategy. This could
potentially be construed as the muddying the boundaries
between the board and the management. However, there18% 3%
12%
Operation & project 
management












Figure 4 Breakdown of the overall staff time resource
by function.
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tion. One respondent explained: “In our HIEC… the way
we mitigated any problems was that the chair and the dir-
ector worked very closely together and, secondly, we did
make sure that the SHA [strategic health authority] as the
final accountable organisation was comfortable with what
we were trying to do, and we regularly reported to them.”
Funding
HIECs largely relied on public funding and partners did
not commit a significant amount of their own resources.
Each HIEC received on average £1.2 m from the Depart-
ment of Health, England in funding during the first two
years in operation. In addition, each HIEC raised on
average £0.5 m in funding from other sources. Whereas
NHS strategic health authorities and non-NHS sources
were the most frequently cited sources of additional
funding, membership fees from HIEC members and pro-
ject funding from HIEC partners were the least fre-
quently cited sources of additional funding. The overall
expenditure of HIECs was split between the commis-
sioning of activities through grants or contracts (39%),
direct delivery of activities (35%), and facilitation, net-
working, communication and enabling (25%).
While all HIECs commented on the very small amount
of new public resources that was available to them, only
36% of HIECs raised project funding from their partners,
and only 21% of HIECs raised funding through member-
ship fees. The latter were seen as a means of securing
both tangible commitment as well as funds. The main
reasons for not seeking membership fees were: reducing
barriers to participation; avoiding duplicating other fee
paying networks; and the difficulty of persuading part-
ners to pay up front without proof of concept of the
HIEC model.
After three years in operation, only 13% of HIECs re-
ported that they were in a position to be self-sustaining
without government funding. Whereas some respon-
dents thought that without substantial funding from the
Department of Health, England or other NHS sources,
the HIEC model was never going to be self-sustaining,
others believed that the structural and political changes
in the NHS did not give a chance for HIECs to become
self-sustaining. One respondent noted: “I think we could
have been self-sustaining if the political will hadn’t chan-
ged, so we were not given the planned third year of funds,
and a sufficient time frame to build our profile.”
Accountability
HIECs encountered significant external and internal ac-
countability challenges. Whereas HIECs regularly reported
on performance to their partners, host organisation, and
to their NHS strategic health authority, they rarely re-
ported directly to patients and infrequently to theDepartment of Health, England. Although one HIEC had
a patient representative appointed as a chair of its board
and several other HIECs experimented with having a pa-
tient representative on their boards, 41% of HIECs never
reported to patients. The main reason for this was that
NHS partners had their own mechanisms for accountabil-
ity to patients. Additionally, many HIECs involved patients
in their project management.
HIECs expected the Department of Health, England to
play a more meaningful role in holding them to account
for public money. Many respondents believed that the
Department of Health, England should have articulated
a vision for HIECs more clearly, possibly, including a set
of short-term, medium-term, and long-term metrics or
indicators to measure their performance against a set of
locally-agreed objectives in a number of priority areas.
One respondent in particular felt that effectively there was
an “abdication of responsibility” on part of the Department
of Health, England in not measuring and evaluating the
performance of HIECs at the national level.
The majority of HIECs were also critical about the qual-
ity of their reporting relationships with NHS strategic
health authorities because, as one respondent put it,
they often were “completely tokenistic.” Some strategic
health authorities requested progress reports too fre-
quently, but concentrated mainly on the financial indica-
tors and did not scrutinise the contents of HIEC projects.
Those strategic health authorities that developed key per-
formance indicators for HIECs did not actually perform-
ance manage HIECs, as one respondent noted, “there were
no consequences if these [indicators] were not adhered to
or delivered.” Finally, a number of HIECs proactively re-
ported to strategic health authorities, but often the latter
were not actively interested in HIECs’ reporting because
strategic health authorities were in the process of being
dissolved.
Nevertheless, HIECs aimed to achieve internal ac-
countability for their projects. Almost always, projects
were performance-monitored by the project leads, the
governing body, and very often-to-always by the HIEC
chief executive. The fact that HIECs were not legal en-
tities limited the scope of means that they could use to
enforce accountability. Namely, HIECs could not draw
legally-binding contracts themselves and instead had to
rely on their host or partner organisations to draw con-
tracts on their behalf. Therefore, when others were de-
livering on their behalf, HIECs used documented project
plans and grant agreements far more frequently than
contracts. Likewise, HIECs used persuasion and peer
pressure as means of enforcement and sanctions for
non-performance far more frequently than financial or
managerial sanctions (Figure 5). The use of these forms
of sanction should not be interpreted as meaning that












never          rarely      sometimes       often        always
Figure 5 Frequency of use of different means of enforcement
and sanctions for non-performance.
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public resources wisely. Rather, the fact that HIECs
were hosted by other organisation shaped the ways in
which they managed accountability relationships.
Partnership termination, succession, and legacy
HIECs had to deal with the issues of termination, suc-
cession, and legacy early in their existence. As one
respondent noted: “We are really just coming into our
powers as we are being disbanded.” Although the fund-
ing from the Department of Health, England stopped at
the end of year two, HIECs carried on their activities
into year three, and some HIECs had planned projects
running well into year four. After three years, 13% of
HIECs were no longer in operation and 18% more had
decided on the termination of their HIEC partnership in
their original form. Yet, only 18% of HIECs had decided
to continue their partnership in a different form. The
main reasons for HIECs’ ceasing operations in their ori-
ginal form were that they became time-limited initiatives
due to structural changes in the NHS, and because gov-
ernment mandated new cross-sector networks, AHSNs,
which either invited HIECs to join, or replaced their
functions.
During their lifespan, 17 HIECs were responsible for
over 200 projects, a majority of which focussed on the
spread of clinical or managerial innovation or evidence-
based practice, particularly, in multi-professional work-
force development, integrated care network development,
and self-care development for patients [16]. Importantly,
HIECs saw their principal legacy as being not only the
completion of a range of timely innovation and education
projects, but also as having built capacity for collaborative
working in their local health economies. Unlike the exclu-
sive cross-sector partnerships between elite teaching hos-
pitals and higher education institutions that predated them,
HIECs were inclusive and covered nearly all of England. In
many areas, HIECs were the first regional cross-sectorhealth partnerships and thus created a precedent of inter-
organisational and cross-sector collaboration. Almost all of
the HIECs that were interviewed demonstrated strong ex-
amples of collaboration between organisations that were
more accustomed to competing, especially teaching hospi-
tals with local district general hospitals. In doing so, many
HIECs believed that they had developed in their local econ-
omies the capacity for collaborative working that would be
particularly useful to the AHSNs.
Discussion
The aim of our study was to provide comprehensive em-
pirical evidence about the implementation of collaborative
governance arrangements in response to the central
government mandate to establish HIECs. We conducted a
national survey of the entire population of HIEC directors
and achieved a 100% response rate. In order to check the
validity of survey findings and to gain broader qualitative
insights, we conducted a group discussion and in-depth
interviews. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
comprehensive study of governance arrangements among
all the cross-sector health collaborations mandated by the
Department of Health, England in recent years. Because
our study is informed by a theory-based framework and
generalisable to the entire population of HIECs, our find-
ings provide both theoretically-informed and empirically-
tested contributions to the literature on collaborative
governance. Our findings will be most relevant to other
cross-sector health collaborations characterised by a vague
mandate with the provision of a small amount of new re-
sources, but also, to a lesser extent, to other cross-sector
collaborations for health. Below, we discuss how the key
characteristics of the HIEC mandate and the policy envir-
onment shaped local implementation responses and make
suggestions for practitioners and policy-makers.
First, local leaders appreciated the opportunity to in-
terpret and implement the HIEC mandate according to
their goals and world-views. There was a general con-
sensus among HIECs that the vagueness of the mandate
in terms of the partnership composition and governance
arrangements positively influenced implementation be-
cause it allowed partners to shape HIECs to fit their
local needs and circumstances. We found a great vari-
ation between HIECs in the number of partners, sector
representation, participation, as well as governance ar-
rangements. We also found that the prescription of a
geographical footprint for HIECs initially slowed down
their formation in some cases. Therefore, we can specu-
late that a more prescriptive approach to partnership
composition and governance arrangements might have
resulted in significant implementation delays or even in-
action. We suggest that when contemplating the use of
vague mandates in terms of partnership composition and
governance arrangements to speed up implementation,
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ation between partnerships that will arise. This may or
may not be of consequence for the policy-maker, depend-
ing on their exact policy objectives.
Second, none of the HIECs were incorporated and/or
registered as a charity because of the unstable policy envir-
onment and the absence of perceived benefits. We did not
find evidence that not having their own legal personality
adversely affected the implementation of HIECs. On the
contrary, many respondents felt that not having to deal
with complex legal matters speeded up the implementation
of HIECs. The form of the governance model was seen as
being of less importance than the idea of the governance
function. Our data show that HIEC governing bodies exer-
cised largely independent decision-making authority within
their mandate, and that they placed a high value on the
governance function in terms of creating a sense of com-
mon purpose and collaborative action. It is therefore un-
clear whether in a more stable policy environment HIECs
would have sought incorporation or registration as a char-
ity; or what the benefits of such a move might have been.
We propose that further research examines AHSCs and
AHSNs that have been successfully incorporated or regis-
tered as a charity in order to elucidate the benefits of these
legal forms for other cross-sector health partnerships.
Third, our data indicate that progress on governance
activities was slowed by the vagueness of the HIEC
mandate as well as by the intrinsically challenging nature
of cross-sector collaborative working. In some cases, we
found evidence of early-stage delays in implementation
due to a prolonged deliberation of the HIEC vision and
mission. Also, achieving full progress on governance ac-
tivities was intrinsically challenging due to the very dif-
ferent expectations, engagement, and commitment of
the board members who came from different sectors. In
line with the findings from the United States that ac-
countability in cross-sector health partnerships can be
difficult to define and enforce [4,5], accountability in
HIECs proved to be one of the more problematic areas
of governance activities. Some respondents believed that
the HIEC mandate should have included metrics or indi-
cators to measure HIECs’ performance against a set of
locally-agreed objectives in a number of priority areas.
This would have facilitated a formal evaluation of the
HIECs nationally. We propose that for cross-sector health
partnerships with a vague mandate and the provision of
new resources, policy-makers develop performance met-
rics in agreement with each locally-constituted partner-
ship and conduct formal evaluations of their activity at the
end of their mandate or funding cycle.
Fourth, in response to the provision of a small amount of
new resources, HIECs established lean management teams,
which, in most cases, did not become self-sustaining. There
were perceptions that the HIEC model was never going tobe self-sustaining without some level of government fund-
ing, as well as data showing that only a minority of HIECs
raised funding from their partners. On the other hand,
there were perceptions that HIECs were not given suffi-
cient time to become self-sustaining. We found that after
two years of initial government funding, most HIECs car-
ried on their activities into year three, and 13% of HIECs
reported that they were in a position to be self-sustaining
without government funding. We can conclude that two
years of government pump-priming funding was not suffi-
cient for HIECs to become self-sustaining, and that it is
likely that over a longer period of time more HIECs would
have become self-sustaining. We argue that for cross-
sector health partnership that are envisaged to become
self-sustaining policy-makers need to provide a longer-
term mandate and pump-prime funding.
Fifth, we did not find evidence, in any of the localities, of
a permanent dominant coalition of partners that appropri-
ated the HIEC mandate and resources to their own ends.
Although we found that self-selected foundational partners
had influence on the partnership composition and on key
appointments, there is no evidence to suggest that they
interpreted the HIEC mandate in their own interests. Like-
wise, chief executives often had influence on both the strat-
egy and operations of HIECs, but approximately half of
them were appointed through an open competitive process,
and in many cases they sat on the board. It may have been
the case that a strong coalition established the HIEC ini-
tially and developed the bid for funding to the Department
of Health, England, but in those cases, we found that the
HIEC once it was established worked hard to extend the
partnership beyond the initial group. It is probably due to
HIECs being envisaged as broad cross-sector collabora-
tions, and the fact that only a small amount of new re-
sources was provided, that dominant coalitions of partners
did not emerge to appropriate the HIEC mandate and re-
sources to their own ends. We hypothesise that the larger
the cross-sector collaboration and the smaller the amount
of the new resources provided, the less the probability of
local dominant coalitions emerging to appropriate the
mandate and resources to their own ends.
Sixth, a broad and inclusive vision for HIECs may have
helped to build a capacity for collaborative working.
HIECs included a large number of partners and in many
areas created a precedent of inter-organisational and
cross-sector collaboration. The overwhelming majority
of HIECs were able to demonstrate strong examples of
collaboration between organisations that were more used
to competing. Previous research on Collaboration for Lead-
ership in Applied Health Research and Care (CLAHRCs)
showed that “[h]istory appears to be a crucial precursor
to more rapid progress within implementation as rela-
tionships and ways of working have been developed
and tested” [19]. Therefore, we expect that the legacy of
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influence implementation of Academic Health Science
Networks (AHSNs) – the new cross-sector health networks
characterised by a vague mandate with the provision of a
small amount of new resources.
Finally, the development of the SAGA survey instru-
ment and the application of the Montjoy and O’Toole
framework in the context of cross-sector health partner-
ships in England represent valuable methodological con-
tributions, which can be used in future research. The
SAGA survey instrument allows for rapid data gathering
and analysis based on a standardised set of governance
concepts and indicators. It can be developed further and
applied to study collaborative governance in other cross-
sector health partnerships, most notably, AHSNs. The
use of the Montjoy and O’Toole framework has a poten-
tial to complement the methodological tools used in a
growing body of literature on knowledge translation in
cross-sector collaborations. The framework draws atten-
tion to the process of interpretation of the government
mandate by local leaders, which has been shown to ex-
plain variation in differing capabilities for knowledge
translation among NIHR CLAHRCs [20,22,27]. Further-
more, the framework has a potential to promote organ-
isational learning between different cross-sector health
partnerships by identifying partnerships with similar
mandate characteristics. For example, in addition to the
relevance of findings from HIECs to AHSNs, the frame-
work highlights that findings from NIHR CLAHRCs
will be most relevant to NIHR BRCs and NIHR BRUs,
which are characterised by a specific mandate with the
provision of new resources (Figure 1).
Limitations
Despite its significant strengths, our study has several
limitations. It is based on the perceptions of and data
supplied by HIEC directors and chairs who may be
biased. Surveying and interviewing the entire population
of HIEC board members or partners might have yielded
different results. Another limitation is that although the
Montjoy and O’Toole framework is a useful tool when
comparing the variations in local responses to a central
government mandate, it was originally developed for the
analysis of intra-organisational implementation. In the
context of inter-organisational implementation, impedi-
ments to intra-organisational implementation continue
to apply and are multiplied by the number of participating
organisations, but there may be other impediments as
well [38,39]. Therefore, our analysis may not fully reflect
the complexity of inter-organisational implementation in
cross-sector health collaborations. Yet another limitation
is that, in order to reduce the complexity of the mandate
characteristics under investigation for analytical purposes,
the Montjoy and O’Toole framework represents mandatecharacteristics as yes/no dichotomies. However, as demon-
strated in Table 1, both the description of expected activity
and the provision of new resources vary between different
partnerships and therefore can be better represented as
continuous variables. Finally, we are unable to deter-
mine which governance characteristics are associated
with greater performance outcomes because there has
been no formal evaluation of HIECs’ performance
nationally.Conclusion
This study has produced valuable insights into the imple-
mentation responses in HIECs and possibly other cross-
sector collaborations characterised by a vague mandate
with the provision of a small amount of new resources.
Although, theoretically, there was a risk that a vague
mandate with the provision of new resources would lead
to local dominant coalitions appropriating the HIEC
mandate and resources to their own ends, there is little
evidence that such local dominant coalitions emerged. On
the other hand, there is evidence of interpretation and im-
plementation of the central mandate by HIEC leaders to
serve their local needs. We, therefore, suggest that policy-
makers provide a longer-term mandate and funding for
cross-sector health partnership that are expected to be-
come self-sustaining. Whereas the vagueness of the
mandate in terms of the partnership composition and gov-
ernance arrangements positively influence implementa-
tion, the vagueness of the vision and mission negatively
affect progress on governance activities. Accountability
proved to be one of the more problematic areas of govern-
ance activities. Two years of government funding was
not sufficient for HIECs to become self-sustaining and
they were adversely affected by an unstable policy envir-
onment. A supportive policy environment and sufficient
time would be crucial to the successful implementation of
new cross-sector collaborations. These findings augur well
for AHSNs, which pick up the mantle of large-scale,
cross-sector collaborations for health and innovation. We
advocate further research to help analyse comparatively
the influence of different governance characteristics on
performance outcomes in cross-sector health collabora-
tions in order to determine “what works, for whom, how,
and in what circumstances” [11,19]; and hope that our
work can form a foundation for examining the impact of
governance on collaborative working in future.Endnote
aThe preliminary results of this study have been
presented at the 1st International Conference of BioMed
Central on “Health Services Research: Evidence-based Prac-
tice”, London, 1-3, July 2014 (http://www.biomedcentral.
com/1472-6963/14/S2/P91).
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